These are the arguments brought forth by the so-called law experts and echoed by the Senators, media, and sympathizers in defense of Trillanes and they keep on repeating them in the media, particularly on TV stations that are always giving them airtime coverage.
1. Amnesty once it is given, more so, after 7 years had elapsed, cannot be taken back;
2. The cases against Trillanes once dismissed cannot be revived, otherwise, double jeopardy sets in;
3. The Amnesty having been approved by the Senate and House of Representatives cannot be declared by Proc. 572 as void ab initio or without any effect;
4. That the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest to Trillanes by the Makati RTC Branch 150 is illegal;
5. The AFP J-1 as the custodian of all the records should be the one to prove that Trillanes did not file his application, not for Trillanes to prove it;
6. That PDU30 was just net fishing over Trillanes in order to get even with him;
7. That PDU30 is the destabilizer, not the opposition; and
8. PDU30 has no authority to declare the Amnesty of Trillanes void ab initio because he is not a judge. Only courts have the power to make the declaration.
The argument from 1- 7, are just but sweeping statements without bothering to explain the factual and evidentiary bases. Hence, even snap thinking will tell us that they have no probative value and cannot stand in court.
With respect to no. 8, wherein no less than a retired Justice of the Supreme Court Vicente Mendoza asserted that “Only courts declare anything void, whether void ab initio or otherwise also known as voidable. That is a judicial function.
With due respect, the grant of Amnesty to Trillanes despite the 3 prerequisite requirements were not complied with, is a kind of error so patent and obvious that the applicant could not have missed them, or is such that the applicant could not have been aware thereof by exercising ordinary prudence. That’s why, the argument that only a court can declare void any document, particularly an Amnesty is a shot in the dark.
The issue regarding the principle of “Do not wait for the court but act now” is no longer novel, this having been decided by the Supreme Court in a long line of cases.
In TEEHANKEE, J., concurring in the case of EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) vs. THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., ET AL., G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985, to require the citizen at every step to assert his rights and to go to court is to render illusory his rights.
So that as written by Justice Makasiar in the PBM case "the Bill of Rights [might not turn out to be] a useless attempt to limit the power of government and cease to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, (which in this case is the Pnoy Administration), of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise."
In SALOMON vs. MENDOZA, G.R. No. L-23628, July 31, 1965; LAWRENCE BOWE, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 95771, March 19, 1993. When the final judgment in an unlawful detainer case states that "the defendant can continue occupying the land as long as she pays monthly rental to the plaintiff", the necessary inference is that if the defendant should fail to pay the rents she could not continue occupying the land. In which case, the plaintiff can occupy the land without the order of the court.
The Supreme Court in Lim v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 564, 570 [1990], is worth quoting: "It is true that the contract to sell imposes reciprocal obligations and so cannot be terminated unilaterally by either party. Judicial rescission is required under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. However, this rule is not absolute. We have held that in proper cases, a party may take it upon itself to consider the contract rescinded and act accordingly albeit subject to judicial confirmation, which may or may not be given. Xxx xxxx xxxx. As we said in University of the Philippines v. De los Angeles (35 SCRA 102 [1970]): . . . But the law definitely does not require that the contracting party who believes itself injured must first file suit and wait for a judgment before taking extrajudicial steps to protect its interest. Otherwise, the party injured by the other's breach will have to passively sit and watch its damages accumulate during the pendency of the suit until the final judgment of rescission is rendered when the law itself requires that he should exercise due diligence to minimize its own damages."
"A void judgment for want of jurisdiction (the granting of Amnesty by Pnoy despite the lack of the essential requirements; and the dismissal by the Makati RTC Courts) is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: ". . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head." (emphasis mine). Clearly, it says, it does not need a declaration by any court with the phrase—it can be slain at sight or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
The above-mentioned Decisions are not dead letters that can be severely emasculated, or rendered illusory. They are the doctrinal declaration of the Supreme Court which is the cornerstone of any free and democratic nation.
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